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AUTHOR'S NOTE
A LMOST IMMEDIATELY upon completion of the writing of this lecture, WaI-

n

ter Lippmann provided me with analytical support in an article entitled
"A Critique of Congress" (Newsweek, January 20, 1964). As a long-time
admirer of Mr. Lippmann, I was glad to have it, but I wish he had permitted me to state the case first since my effort antedated his. Nevertheless
I strongly encourage the politically interested to read the Lippmann column, for it is a perceptive bit of political writing, and it states more clearly
and succinctly than I have done in the pages which follow one of the essential points that I have tried to make. The "principle" of legislative supremacy, Lippmann says, is abused when it is employed by the Congress in the
cause of "smothering and strangling" measures deemed to be of national
interest by the President and presented to the national legislature for its consideration. Ours is, he adds, a difficult system to operate, and its success depends upon the application of "a very large supply of common sense." In
short, Mr. Lippmann warns us against a reverence for so-called principles
and forms that obscure the ends they were designed to achieve.
In fact there is nothing substantially new in what either Mr. Lippmann
or I propose. The failure to heed the warning, however, has always brought
grief to the human race. It seems appropriate, then, to state it anew. The
worst mistake men can make, in my opinion, is to assume that they have now
arrived at that stage of perfection of institutional development which precludes the necessity of further alteration and adjustment. Yet no mistake
is so persistently made, and each generation is compelled to learn again the
sad truth that public problems can never be permanently solved, and that
what have been almost universally regarded as fundamental and immutable
principles become woefully inadequate in the course of time. They often become, indeed, a camouflage for those who employ them for selfish purposes.
One of my minor heroes, the Marquis of Halifax, stated almost three
hundred years ago that what men call "fundamentals" are "a nail everybody would use to fix that which is good for them; for all men would have
that principle to be immovable that serves their use at the time .... Fundamental is a word used by the laity, as the word sacred is by the clergy, to fix
everything to themselves they have a mind to keep, that nobody else may
touch it."
I wish I had said that.
- M. JUDD HARMON
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THE SEARCH FOR ' CONSENSUS
political scientists develop a particular way of looking at
the world and interpreting its events. Because of the forces which act
upon us all, the view may be excessively narrow, its importance may be exaggerated, and it may be inaccurate as an interpretive device. Yet it is a key
to understanding for the person who employs it. He inclines to view all public problems in its light and tends to assume that the solution of social problems is contingent upon an adequate understanding and appreciation of it.
My own view, and I make no claim to originality in expressing it, is
that the political process in a democratic community involves essentially the
search for a consensus. This necessitates the development of methods of
arriving at conclusions on public policies which are in the public interest
and are acceptable to majorities. In authoritarian communities where the
principle of consent is of no substantial importance, this is not a major problem. In these polities, decisions are made and imposed by leaders who may
or may not take the public interest into account but who, at any rate, are not
required to consult the public before making decisions. In democratic communities the matter is more complex. Since democratic government requires
the consent of the governed, it must be discovered what that consent involves and whether or not it is really given. Consensus means a general
agreement. Not everyone need consent to a particular proposition but a
majority must, and the position of a dissenting minority must be noted and
respected. Finally, that minority ought not to be outraged; at least to the
extent that it is, consensus is minimized.
The difficulty of developing a consensus in a free community is that
the particular interests of individuals and associated groups of individuals
often stand in the way. As my more attentive students, past and present,
will affirm, I have long argued that the conflict between particular interests
and the general interest is, and has always been, the chief political problem
confronting mankind. Past failure to resolve the conflict has resulted in
domestic and international strife. Future failure may have far more dire
consequences. I am not optimistic about the prospects. The problem is both
ubiquitous and persistent; the solutions proffered are plethoric. I have recently completed the writing of a history of political thought covering the
period from the Greek city-states of antiquity to the totalitarian regimes of
the mid-twentieth century. In the course of this project I have reread the
writings of the great political thinkers of history and noted, 'as I have in the
past, that each of them was vitally concerned with the social ill that I have
described. The study of political thought is indeed concerned largely with
) this matter. Some of the solutions prescribed are stimulating but unrealistic;
some are revolting to decent and freedom-loving people; some are worthy
of greater attention than has been given them.
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It is discouraging to a student of the political process that man appears
to be no closer to a solution of the problem of interest conflict now than he
was more than two thousand years ago. But although it is discouraging it is
understandable. Its cause is deeply rooted in human nature; at least I am
convinced that it is. The problem in simple terms stems from the fact that
as individuals each of us has desires which set us in conflict with our fellows.
The motivation for self-gratification may not be as powerful as Thomas
Hobbes, among others, thought it was, but it is there and must be reckoned
with. In some instances the pursuit of selfish goals may have no effect upon
our fellows. We can, for example, breathe all the air we want without concerning ourselves with the welfare of our neighbors. But the list of meaningful actions which an individual can take without impinging in some manner
upon others is indeed short.
It is also possible that the individual pursuit of self-interest may be of
benefit to society. Adam Smith formulated his enormously influential economic doctrine on precisely this assumption. If each person is left free, he
stated, to pursue his own economic interest the unseen hand of competition
will mysteriously but inevitably work in the general interest and produce a
kind of utopian society. Whatever benefits may have flowed from the functioning of an economic system based upon this premise, and there have undoubtedly been many, it also gave rise to a predatory economic system which
brought misery to millions. It did not, in short, result in that service to the
public interest which Smith, relying upon logic rather than empiricism, had
thought would be inevitable. It seems fair to conclude that in the search for
consensus laissez-faire, economic or otherwise, is of limited value. The fact
is that much of what we might do, if we were unrestrained, would be harmful to others. We may resent the restraint if we are doing the harm; we demand it when we are being harmed.
There is another view which is pertinent. It has been argued that there
is in fact no conflict between a real personal interest and the general interest.
When the individual acts in a manner that is injurious to his fellows he is
really harming himself; he is serving his apparent rather than his genuine
interest. This point was made by Jean Jacques Rousseau, who attempted to
synthesize the particular and the general interest in his theory of the General Will. Rousseau's principal contribution, however, lies in his perception
of the problem rather than in any practicable solution of it. The General
Will was little more than the absolute rule of the majority and is repellent
to one concerned with the protection of minorities. Rousseau himself concluded that the General Will could function only in the city-state form of
political organization.
If the knowledge of man's failure to provide a satisfactory solution to
this problem is depressing, it is positively frightening to note that as time
goes on the problem becomes more difficult to solve. There are a number of
reasons for this. A rapidly increasing population multiplies the number of
personal interests. An industrial society promotes divergency of interest.
Modem methods of communication and transportation increase our inter-4-

dependency. If the accommodation of interests was so difficult within the
small and relatively simple society of, say, the Athenian city-state, how much
more so is it in the populous and complex nation-state of the present! In the
twentieth century the people of a number of nations, appalled by the confusion attending a conflict of interests which appeared to them to border on
anarchy and unable to develop a voluntary consensus, have surrendered
their freedom and accepted the authority of an absolute government. Both
Hitler and Mussolini promised to relieve their people of the terrible burden
of making decisions in a troublesome and complicated world. The results
of that abdication of personal responsibility demonstrate the futility and
danger of any solution based upon the complete relinquishment of individual freedom.
I do not wish to imply that a total solution is desirable, for it could
create a worse situation than that which provoked it. We could assume, for
example, that men are so evil and selfish that if they are granted any freedom to pursue individual goals they would inevitably damage the general
interest; the only remedy in such a case would be an autocratic regime and
a correlative suppression of personal liberty. This was the conclusion of
Hobbes as it was, and is, of the totalitarians of the present century. A second
possibility is anarchy. If men are naturally good and altruistic and have
become corrupted only because of institutional restraints, then the obvious
answer lies in the elimination of the institutions. This is what Marx proposed should follow a period of preparation in the proletarian dictatorship;
it is also very nearly what Adam Smith suggested, although the anarchist
implications of Smith's theory are not so well understood.
Some argue that the danger of such extremist views can be circumvented through an institutional arrangement which anticipates conflicts of
interest and reconciles or restrains them. This is the direction in which Locke
points and the position most clearly taken by Montesquieu. The philosophies of both were influential with the framers of the Constitution of the
United States. I intend to devote attention to this matter later. Suffice it to
say at this point that whatever may have been, or is, the value of such institutional arrangements as separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, and others, they have by no means solved the problem of interest
conflict. Indeed they often prevent rather than facilitate solutions, and they
demonstrate to me that to the degree that such institutional arrangements
are inflexible they are worse than useless. They contribute to stalemate by
requiring that problems be solved within a rigid and established institutional
framework which too soon becomes anachronistic. The world of contingency and change is much larger than the rigid institutionalists imagine.
Here is the essence of the problem which I intend to discuss.
There is an element of validity in each of the three proposals I have
cited. All men require some restraint and some a great deal. They also want
some freedom. And the institutionalists are correct in advocating structural
arrangements capable of reconciling conflicts of interest; they are incorrect,
however, in assuming that any such arrangement can solve all problems and
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more so when they propose that institutions adequate to the needs of one
time and place should be regarded as universal and immutable. We may
safely acknowledge that the necessity for government is universal. We cannot similarly universalize forms of government; neither can we assume their
permanent validity.
Certain assumptions, then, seem warranted. One is that it is impossible
to organize society in such a manner as to preclude all conflict of interest.
But it is also necessary to hold conflict within reasonable bounds. Failure to
do so will result in the collapse of society. Human nature being what it is,
however, complete homogeneity and absence of conflict can be achieved
only at the cost of freedom. A corollary of this assumption is that even a
proximate solution will be difficult to find and will be incapable of achieving universal approbation. It is natural, I presume, to wish to have all of our
problems solved; this, however, is impossible even on a personal level. Its
impossibility should be even more apparent when it comes to national and
international problems. The attractiveness of radical movements of both
left and right lies largely in that each promises to solve problems of great
magnitude swiftly and simply. The leftists argue that abandonment of the
private ownership of the means of production will result in utopia. The
rightists say that the state of blessedness is contingent upon abolition of the
income tax, the federal government, foreign aid. The perceptive student of
politics knows that solutions are not so easily found. He may not be able to
provide an answer, but he understands that any answer will be enormously
complex and only partially satisfactory.
A second assumption is that although government is necessary its form
will vary with both time and circumstances. A governmental structure adequate for Americans would probably be hopelessly inappropriate for Abyssinians. The point is difficult for many to comprehend, but far less difficult
than it is to understand that a governmental structure which may have
served Americans well in 1800 could only fail if it were pitted against the
conditions of the mid-twentieth century. Those who contend that the national salvation is contingent upon a return to the supposed purity of the
principles of the Founding Fathers are either abysmally ignorant of the
realities of political life, or they are guilty of attempting to disguise their
mm selfish goals with a cloak of spurious respectability. The validity of governmental structures is relative. I see no sanctity in any of them; on the contrary I see great danger in attributing that quality to them. Thomas Jefferson stated this idea with great force.
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence and deem
them like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe
to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose
what they did to be beyond amendment.... I am certainly not an advocate
for frequent and untried changes in laws and constitutions. I think moderate imperfections go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind .
. . . As new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and
opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man
to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to
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remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors .... Each generation ... has a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes the most promotive of its own happiness ....

Jefferson was an ardent champion of states' rights; it is unlikely that he
would be today. In his time the states' rights doctrine supported governmental responsibility and democracy; today it is too often a cover for Neanderthal politicians who pursue a policy of race discrimination and outrage
the rights of minorities within their states. This is only one of a great many
examples which could be cited to illustrate the point that we too often lose
the substance while retaining the form. It should also demonstrate that a
government should be judged by what it does, not by the form it takes.
It seems to me, in other words, that we have a tendency to confuse the
ends we seek with the means which are developed to achieve them. If we
grant that the proper goal is the attaining of a consensus and that this necessarily requires the accommodation of the particular and the general interest
(which is another way of saying that we seek the general welfare) , then we
err if we fail to achieve it because of our reluctance or refusal to modify
methods, regardless of how successful they might previously have been. I
am not suggesting that the end always justifies the means. I have already
stated that I reject the solutions of the extremists, and I further repudiate
the notion that the general welfare can ever be achieved unless the substantive liberties of the individual are preserved. I confine my discussion and
recommendations to methods and institutional adjustments which, I believe,
would not outrage the sensitivities of those who, rightly, are concerned with
means as well as ends.
As a people we ought to develop a new way of looking at political problems. We should view them more critically and with a greater fund of
knowledge supporting the criticism. We must first recognize the distinction
between means and ends and, second, we should abandon our attitude of
reverence toward the means. We should devote less time to extolling the
virtues of our institutions and praising their past successes and more to a
critical appraisal of them in the light of present conditions. We need less
oratory and more pragmatism. Such proposals, of course, always cause conservative hackles to rise, and throughout the land the warning goes forth
against "revolution." But wise conservatives, as well as progressives, also
know that it is the failure to adjust the means, to alter institutions as conditions demand, that is most responsible for revolution. This is a lesson that
history has repeatedly taught, and it is remarkable that it has not yet been
learned by many. Remarkable but understandable. There develops in every
society a vested interest in the status quo, one with social, political, and economic manifestations. Those who benefit most from the status quo are most
reluctant to consider suggestions for change. Even when they are precariously poised on the precipice of revolution they tend resolutely to look the
other way and to reject the reforms that might salvage at least part of their
heritage. The pages of history are replete with accounts of this fatal weakness. The collapse of the Bourbon, Stuart, and Romanoff dynasties provides
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only three examples; there are many more. It is also a fact that the people
are generally conservative. They prefer the established ways. They will endure considerable inconvenience, even hardship, before sanctioning change.
In our own country a greater alteration of institutions has occurred
than is recognized by most. The political party system, without a shred of
constitutional sanction, has developed and brought to government a measure of democracy and responsibility that would have received the most profound disapproval of the framers of the Federal Constitution. The commerce and taxing clauses of the Constitution have been put to uses on behalf
of the general welfare that would have evoked cries of anguish from the
members of the Philadelphia Convention. And perhaps most important
of all, the cumbersome and complex electoral college system now permits
rather than precludes the democratic election of a President of the United
States.
These and other developments have maintained the viability of our
system. Without them we would have had either to abandon it or see it
become authoritarian. We have, therefore, at least implicitly acknowledged
the necessity of institutional metamorphosis. We must extend the operation
of the principle to other areas. This is an enormously difficult task, and I am
not sanguine about the prospects of accomplishing it. Under the most favorable circumstances people are reluctant even to question the validity of institutional arrangements, let alone alter them substantially. The reluctance
is compounded in a period of international tension such as we have been
undergoing for the past quarter of a century or more. Yet it should be done,
and the range of criticism and analysis should not stop short of some of the
most fundamental aspects of our system.
I can do no more here than suggest a few of the more important reforms that I regard as desirable. There are others, but in my own thinking
these have come to occupy a central position. They are fundamental in the
formulation of that context within which I tend to interpret the functioning
of our governmental system. And if I am wrong in my concern I am not
alone. Few political analysts have suggested an exhaustive analysis and
basic alteration of some of the most hallowed of our governmental structures. Nevertheless, the almost total preoccupation of students of government with problems arising from the malfunctioning of these structures indicates to me that some such action is necessary. I shall consider here four
of them: the separation of powers and checks and balances, federalism,
legislative supremacy, and direct representation.

THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS
AND BALANCES
and checks and balances is the theory that the
best way to avoid despotic government is to assign the three major functions of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, to three separate
agencies and to provide. each with powers to prevent the abuse of authority
by the others. In its basic elements the concept is very old. In the seven-
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teenth century it was advocated by John Locke in the Second Treatise, and
it received its fullest consideration and development in Montesquieu's The
Spirit of the Laws in the middle of the eighteenth century. It is necessary
to understand the circumstances in which Locke and Montesquieu wrote.
Each was interested in attacking the abuses of power by absolute monarchs
- Locke those of the Stuarts and Montesquieu those of the Bourbons. Since
Montesquieu was, with respect to this doctrine, more influential among
Americans than Locke I shall use him here as the main point of reference.
In most respects, Montesquieu's separation of powers theory was reactionary. It regarded absolute monarchy as an innovation, which it was, and
looked back nostalgically to the class structure of commoners, nobles, and
royalty that had prevailed in the medieval period. His animosity toward
the Bourbon autocracy of his own time led Montesquieu to take a distorted
view of the past. He believed that medieval times had been stable and
peaceful and that this was because there had existed a well-defined class
structure, each part of which had its established and protected prerogatives.
He assumed that the turbulence of his own era had resulted from the destruction of that system. In fact medievalism had not been as utopian as
Montesquieu thought. The particularism resulting from the will to power
of the feudal aristocracy had led to a forced unity imposed by a king supported by the middle class, which believed that its own advantage would be
secured by such action.
Montesquieu's theory was appealing to Americans who, around the
time of the Revolution, understandably tended to equate governmental
power with tyranny and executive authority in particular with the policies
of the sometimes mad George III. Upon declaring their independence,
Americans proceeded in the establishment of their own governments to
regard them with the same suspicion that had marked their view of their
former British masters. A concept of government designed originally to
maintain a balance of power among contesting classes was adopted unquestioningly by a people who, for the most part, rejected the notion of a society
based upon a rigid class structure. The French statesman Turgot, watching
these developments with great interest, commented sardonically but perceptively:
I see in the greatest number of the American State Constitutions an unreasonable imitation of the usages of England. Instead of bringing all the
authorities into one, that of the nation, they have established different
bodies - A House of Representatives, a council, a governor, - because
England has a House of Commons, lords, and a King. They undertake to
balance these different authorities, as if the same equilibrium of powers
which has been thought necessary to balance the enormous preponderance
of royalty could be of any use in republics, formed upon the equality of all
citizens; and as if every article which constitutes different bodies was not
a source of divisions. By striking to escape imaginary dangers, they have
created real ones.

Precisely. And this situation led to the development in the American
mind of a kind of political schizophrenia. It has long seemed incredible to
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me that the American people are often strident in their demands for governmental action and at the same time suffer a guilt complex because of this
supposedly immoral conduct. We need, perhaps, mass psychiatric treatment capable of convincing us that democratic and responsible government
can be strong without being despotic and can provide service without necessarily contributing to the corruption of our morals.
Americans take great pride in the principle of separation of powers and
checks and balances, often attributing to it the successes our system has
enjoyed over the years. What is not sufficiently understood is that, whatever
the advantages that may flow from a system based upon the principle, to the
degree that separation of powers and checks and balances "work," government does not. The process of a bill being passed by Congress, vetoed by the
President, repassed over the presidential veto by a two-thirds majority of
rebellious legislators only to be nullified by the Supreme Court may be an
exciting one, but it is certainly unproductive. It is full of sound and fury
signifying stalemate. Such a system was tolerable during a period of our
history when the necessity of efficient and operable government was not so
great. The near paralysis that often results from its operation in the vastly
different political climate of the mid-twentieth century makes it a much
more pressing problem today. It appears to me that separation of powers
and checks and balances dangerously encourage factionalism and bar the
path to the consensus that is necessary for national survival. Moreover, in
the light of the British experience it is obvious that the principle is not indispensable to the operation of a democratic system. It is one of the strange
quirks of history that at the very time we were copying and implementing
what we conceived to be a system based on the English model of separation
and checks, the British themselves were in the process of developing the parliamentary and cabinet system which negates it. And whatever criticism one
might level against the British system of government, only the unenlightened
could charge that despotism was the result of that repudiation. I suggest
that the idea of the general interest being better served by a policy of government cooperation than by one of warring branches is neither unwise nor
immoral. It is, rather, only common sense.

FEDERALISM
criticisms of separation of powers may also be leveled
against federalism. Montesquieu advocated a federal system because
he believed that a consensus was impossible in anything other than a small
polity. Again, Montesquieu was influenced by his reverence for medieval
institutions. He could not see that the particularism of the feudal system
had resulted in its demise and the consequent rise of monarchical power.
There was already the necessity for a national consensus, but this was not
apparent to Montesquieu, whose major concern was a restoration of the
prerogatives of the aristocracy. Montesquieu conceded that the demands of
security required a greater degree of cohesion where matters of military and
foreign policy were concerned; thus he proposed a confederative system in
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which domestic policy would be in the hands of the component units of the
confederation whereas military and diplomatic matters would be directed
by a central government.
It was this assumption that a national consensus is necessary in foreign and military affairs but not in domestic affairs that so greatly influenced Americans in the post-Revolutionary period. The assumption was
unfounded when Montesquieu made it, still more wrong when Americans
incorporated the principle into their own system, and I believe it is almost
wholly anachronistic today. That Americans had carried the confederate
principle too far in the Articles of Confederation, which rather faithfully
followed Montesquieu's idea, was argued by the Federalists - Hamilton,
Adams, Marshall, and others. They were successful in obtaining the ratification of the present Constitution, which departs considerably from the confederative principles of the Articles. Hamilton would have gone further.
He urged the elimination of the states altogether and the creation of a single
nation. Many of his compatriots agreed in principle but recognized that the
public, already suspicious of events in Philadelphia, would reject such a
proposal out of hand. The Founding Fathers settled for a new constitution
which vested an imposing array of powers in the national government but
left undetermined the central issue of whether the United States comprised
a single nation or a coalition of independent states, each of which voluntarily lent a portion of its sovereign powers to the national government to be
exercised at the pleasure of the states.
This was an issue that arose almost as soon as the Constitution was
placed in operation; it became more critical as the years passed. Were we
a nation, or weren't we? Was there a national interest or were there merely
the particular interests of the states? Under the circumstances was it legitimate to think in terms of a national consensus, or was this contrary to the
constitutional intent of the Founding Fathers? The United States became
a nation when a majority of Americans possessing a superior force of arms
became convinced that there was a national interest on an issue of overriding importance and that it should prevail over the particular interests of the
Southern States. A bloody civil war was required to establish the point, and
there is considerable evidence that it has not yet been learned by many, but
this is nonetheless what that unfortunate and "irrepressible" conflict was
about. The American Civil War is a striking illustration of the fact that institutions must conform to changing conditions or die. My own feeling is that
in the bitter debate that preceded the conflict, the spokesmen for the South
had the better of the constitutional argument. This counted for nothing in
the end because they were making the classical error of attempting to maintain the status quo. Such efforts, irrespective of how admirable they may be,
must inevitably be cast upon the ash heap of history.
Whatever one's personal feelings on the matter may be, the fact is that
we must be a nation or we shall perish. The major domestic problems of our
society are manifestly national problems. The growing imbalance of state
and national power, in favor of the latter, is almost wholly attributable to
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the fact that states have been unable or unwilling to meet the needs of their
people. If the national government has itself often been found wanting in
this regard, if it has been less efficient than it might have been, the fault lies
in large part in the federal principle. A member of Congress who is compelled to pursue the national interest with one foot always in his own constituency will be generally found running in circles. I intend shortly to
explore this issue in more detail. Suffice it to say here that in my opinion the
national government does the job of governing better than do the states.
To a great many people who still think in terms of the Jeffersonian
tradition of local government, the inexorable enlargement of national power
is frightening. We have been nurtured by a tradition which holds that
despotism expands in proportion to the increase of geographic distance
between the citizen and those who govern him. Thus local government is
ideally honest, responsible, responsive, efficient, and incorruptible. The national government, centered in faraway Washington, is dishonest, irresponsible, unresponsive, inefficient, and corrupt. This belief is without foundation in fact as most informed students of government agree. I am not suggesting that all federal officials are paragons of virtue and efficiency or that
the national government is a model of competence. But compared with the
governments of most of the states and especially the sub-units of the states,
the national government is greatly superior. In our daily lives most of us
acknowledge this without thinking much about the matter. Bitter experience has taught us that if national resources are to be conserved the national
government, not the states, must conserve them. If we wish the apprehension of a dangerous criminal we hope that there is a federal issue involved
so that the Federal Bureau of Investigation or some other federal agency
may have jurisdiction, because we have greater respect for their abilities
than we do for those of the local constabulary. A great variety of examples
could be offered to substantiate the view.
Jefferson's contention that local governments were more responsive to
the will of the people was based upon the fact that with the primitive methods of transportation and communication which existed at the time, the
people could not be as knowledgeable of the operations of their national
government as they were of the governments of their communities. Today,
however, the affairs of Washington and the world are no further than an
electric switch or the newspaper on the front porch. Moreover those affairs
are highly publicized. Great and powerful news organizations vie with one
another to root out information for the public. Today the vast majority of
citizens are more interested in and have a more detailed knowledge of the
functioning of their national government than they do of their local governments. Given this greater interest and knowledge, given the fact that the
national government provides a large variety of services and imposes many
regulations, and recognizing that those who make national policy are elected
just as are the officials of local govenlment, it follows that the responsiveness of the national government to the demands of constituents is more sub-
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stantial than that of local officials. Indeed, in my opinion, the responsiveness may well be excessive, and I shall comment on this subsequently.
All this serves to illustrate another manifestation of that national schizophrenia to which I earlier referred. In fact we demand national service
and generally recognize it as superior in quality to that provided by state and
local governments. Yet because this is contrary to a tradition with which we
have long lived we tend to regard ourselves as culpable because of our actions. We applaud the impassioned oratory of states righters and term it
"American"; at the same time our interest is focused upon the national government, and our real hope for a solution to the important public problems
lies there. This is further evidence of our confusion over ends and means.
The increasing complexity and ramification of political issues has nationalized them and considerably outdated federalism. Why should this so deeply
concern us? The goal of government is still the same - to provide a community in which the good life, moral and material, may be lived. If this is
better accomplished by the national than by state governments, why should
we not employ it. If there is Scriptural support for federalism I have not
found it. I do not argue that state and local governments and services be
abandoned wholesale. I do suggest that we approach the problem of the
assignment of responsibilities logically rather than emotionally. Of course
we have over the years steadily been altering our federal system. But we
have done so grudgingly and have experienced inconvenience and sometimes flirted with disaster because our predilection to sanctify the means
produces indecision. And the guilt we feel when we alter our path often
makes us susceptible to the exhortations of the dim witted who chastise us
for departing from the "traditions of the Fathers." I have admiration and
respect for the teachings of the past. A study of history, and particularly the
history of political thought, leads me to conclude, however, that the greatest
lesson history has to offer is that man cannot live in the past, cannot use the
institutions appropriate to one generation for a later generation, and that
attempts to do so have been consistently fatal to the polities of yesterday.

LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
HE MIDDLE CLASS in England and Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries became disillusioned with the absolute monarchs whom
they had helped to power. There ensued a series of revolutions the chief
purpose of which was to substitute the authority of representative legislative
bodies for that of the king. Locke in his S econd Treatise, which subsequently
provided a handbook for our own revolutionary forebears, stated that the
"legislative" should be "the supreme power in every commonwealth" and
that the best kind of government was that in which "the Legislative power
is put into the hands of divers Persons who, duly Assembled, have by them,selves, or jointly with others, a Power to make Laws." The reason for the
abandonment of the monarch by the middle class in favor of a body of its
own representatives is easily discoverable. The king had been supported
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earlier because it appeared that only he was capable of suppressing a disorderly nobility, which had for centuries obstructed the channels of commerce and cut deeply into the earnings of the bourgeoisie. But monarchs
ultimately forgot their debt to the middle class. The expense of consolidating their own powers and of satisfying extraterritorial ambitions was great,
and the thirst for revenues could only be slaked at the fountain of bourgeois profits. The resentful middle class proceeded to remove the heads of
the more intransigent monarchs and strip the rest of most of their powers.
The ultimate result was the rise of republics and constitutional monarchies
in which representative legislative bodies exercised the bulk of political
power. Once again we see the operation of that irrevocable historical rule
that institutions must alter or perish. Or to state the case differently, when
the established means are no longer capable of achieving the desired ends
their replacement is imperative.
At the time of the framing of our own state and national constitutions
the principle of legislative supremacy was almost unanimously approved.
Americans restricted both the terms and the prerogatives of their own executives, making them essentially figureheads and subservient to the legislatures in whom the bulk of power was lodged. It soon became apparent
that they had gone too far. Shortly after the beginning of the nineteenth
century constitutional conventions were held in a number of states to repair
the damage resulting from a serious imbalance of legislative-executive authority. That the people's earlier views had been colored by their colonial
experience could now be more clearly seen. As a delegate to the New York
constitutional convention of 1821 put it:
An erroneous idea seems to have prevailed in relation to the powers and
origin of the governor. Who is he? and by whom is he appointed? Does
he derive his authority from the king of Great Britain? Is he an usurper?
If so, let us unite to depose him. But, sir, he is the man of the peopleelected by their suffrages and identified with their interests. He is a watchful sentinel to guard us from evil and a zealous friend to admonish us of
error.

The issue could hardly be stated more clearly. There is a difference, extensively sensed and felt but not often enough thought out and coherently
understood and expressed, between an hereditary and divine right monarch
on the one hand and an executive elected by a majority in a system of universal suffrage on the other. The first is irresponsible, the second is responsible. The first is removable only by force (or by pressure which threatens
force) , the second must bow to the will of the electorate expressed through
the voting process.
The organization of national political parties in Jefferson's time and
the broadening of the suffrage in the Jacksonian era brought the first of the
popular chief executives who have ever since captivated the interest and
often the hearts of the American people. Ours became a presidential rather
than a congressional system of government. The eyes of the nation are on
the White House far more than on Capitol Hill. Interest in presidential
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elections greatly surpasses that in congressional or state elections. In the
majority of the struggles between President and Congress, the executive has
won, and he could not have done so without popular support. A President
may be loved or hated; he is always the focal point of national interest and
the object of the nation's concern.
These developments are attributable to a number of causes, but the
main one is that the President of the United States is the only official (I except the Vice President whose authority and prestige are only potential)
who is, by virtue of the manner in which he is elected, the representative of
the general interest. By the same token Congress is representative of the
particular interests. It could well be fatal for a Congressman to support the
national interest rather than the interest of his state or district on an issue
where the two are in conflict. But a President cannot afford to be the captive of a particular interest. At any rate if he is and the fact is discovered
his influence and power are seriously jeopardized. There have been such
Presidents in the past; history has relegated them to an inferior status as
compared with those who have struggled for the national interest against
the omnipresent and potent special interests.
Legislative supremacy was advocated as a solution to a problem arising out of certain conditions. The question today is whether different conditions justify a continued adherence to the principle. In short, is the legislative ordinarily more representative of the general interest than is the executive? My own feeling is that it is not. Nor does it possess the expert
knowledge necessary to frame the intricate and detailed legislation that is
called for in modern times. The great majority of important bills introduced
in Congress today originate with the executive. Congress, as students of
government well understand, has become a debating and ratifying body
rather than a legislative body in the traditional sense of the word. Unfortunately Congress is also often an obstructive body. It has evolved an elaborate system of organization, rules, procedures, and customs which places
disproportionate power in the hands of a few who often use it to frustrate
the majority will. It is a situation which cannot be explored here, but a
cursory reading of a daily newspaper suffices to illustrate it. Some of the
more responsible members of Congress have lectured their colleagues on the
errors of their ways but without visible effect. Legislative bodies should
heed the lessons of history, or they are likely to find themselves in the unhappy position of the monarchs whose authority they appropriated. Even
the most apathetic public is eventually bound to be impressed by the barrage
of criticism that has been leveled against Congress by its critics.
The national consensus today is far more likely to be reflected in policies and actions of the President than in those of Congress. This indicates
the desirability of an altered role for our legislative body. It should always
have the power to say "no" to the President, but the basis upon which it does
so should be changed considerably. If this is to be done, Congress must be
reformed. Under our system it can only reform itself. I cannot detail the
desired reforms here, but they are well known. Fundamentally reform must
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be directed toward making Congress more capable of reflecting a national
consensus, a general interest. Changes in procedures to facilitate majority
rule and the curbing of obstructionist tactics are necessary. The Supreme
Court's 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr~ upholding the jurisdiction of federal
courts over law-suits challenging malapportionment of the legislative districts of a state is bound to have far-reaching and beneficial consequences in
the struggle to increase the representative quality of the House of Representatives. Other views of this problem will be discussed in the following
section.
In this, as in other aspects of the problem that we have been considering, it is apparent that practice has outrun the theoretical functioning of
our institutions. Framers of our Constitution thought that the President
would be an arbiter between the House of Representatives and the Senate
and that he would act as an executive agent of the Congress. The President
has, of course, become far more powerful than this. He is today the chief
legislator as well as the chief executive, and his authority has far exceeded
that for which even the most ardent supporters of executive power in the
Philadelphia Convention hoped. This would not have occurred had not
changing circumstances demanded it and had not the public endorsed it.
The change of means was necessary to the achievement of the same end.
Again, we sense this - indeed we demand it. But we still experience that
feeling of guilt in doing so. We still tend to equate executive power with
despotism and a President of the United States with a divine right monarch.
This often leads us to place unnecessary barriers in our own path. For instance we elect a President who pledges support to a program designed to
accomplish the general interest, and we then commend as "independent,"
and thus admirable, those legislators, even in his own party, who obstruct
him in his pursuit of that goal. We admire and demand strong presidents,
but there are many who level the charge of dictatorship when one appears.
We attack a President for infringing upon the prerogatives of Congress, as
if the prerogatives of Congress should be anything less than the serving of
the general interest. And whoever heard of a dictator submitting to the will
of the electorate every four years? There ought to be, within Congress and
without, a more intelligent recognition of the appropriate scope of Congressional action in the present era. It is still a highly important one involving debate, the airing of public issues, criticism, passage of legislation, investigation, watchdog duties, and more. But it is not what it used to be, and
the principle of legislative supremacy can no longer be regarded as it was
formerly. New institutional arrangements must mirror the conditions of the
changing society.

DIRECT REPRESENTATION
to the development of consensus in the Congress
are the methods by which the members are nominated and elected. In
part, this impediment was imposed by the framers of our Constitution who
provided that a member of Congress must be an "inhabitant" of the state

T

HE CHIEF OBSTACLES

-16 -

he represents. Direct representation was a part of the English political tradition that Americans inherited along with their language. It was, however,
reinforced by the conditions that prevailed at the time we won our independence and established our own governments. As we have seen previously, this was a period of intense state loyalty. Men generally considered
themselves as citizens of their respective states first and citizens of the United
States second, if at all. No one thought that his own interest and that of his
fellow citizens within a state could be fairly and adequately represented by
a resident of another state. Again, we were not yet a nation and the concept
of a common interest outside of military and diplomatic necessity was undeveloped.
But a nation was established and a common interest requiring a national consensus for its achievement was recognized more generally. The
problem was, and is, the formulation of such a consensus in the face of the
existence of a system of nomination and election which reflects the particular more than it does the general interest. Our salvation, thus far, has been
the office of the President precisely because the method by which the President is elected requires him to represent the generality. The President has
also developed "carrot and stick techniques" to assist him in obtaining support from a recalcitrant Congress. The particularism of Congress does not
reflect upon the character of its members, the overwhelming majority of
whom are honorable men. But Congressmen, responsible for their nomination and election to their own constituencies, understand that if they are
to win and maintain their positions they must satisfy those constituencies.
What constituencies want and what the national interest demands are all
too often different things. Irrespective of a southern senator's personal feelings on the matter he may be advised to oppose a civil rights bill. The representative of a constituency containing a preponderance of members of
organized labor would perhaps be unwise to support compulsory arbitration
even if he were convinced that the nation as a whole would be better off
if he did. The legislator representing an agricultural state, regardless of his
views with respect to the national interest, feels a strong compulsion to vote
on farm legislation the way his constituents demand.
It has been argued that out of the welter of conflicting particular interests the general interest somehow emerges. This mysterious process supposedly functions in a manner similar to Adam Smith's "unseen hand." In
fact it does sometimes; often it does not, and stalemate or the benefiting of
the particular interest is at least as likely to result. A member of Congress
is understandably reluctant to concede that the desires of his constituents
are in opposition to the interests of the nation as a whole. He is more likely
to assert that what is good for his constituents is good for the country. Undoubtedly this is sometimes the case, but it would b~ naive to assume that
it is always true. The recent outcry of "economy-minded" Congressmen
against the decision of the administration to deactivate a number of unessential military installations is but one of many recent illustrations of the
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point. Congressmen generally favor governmental parsimony, but not if it
adversely affects conditions in their own states or districts.
Today the Congress seems more to occupy the position of an antagonist
than that of a co-worker with the President. This is not so much a matter
of party affiliation as many think. Support for and opposition to the President in Congress overruns party lines. The fact is that the national interest
today is represented by the President. The opposition to this development
is in the states, and they are represented by Congress. The President has the
force of history on his side, but he has no monopoly of institutional controls
in his hands. Great powers are constitutionally in the hands of Congress,
which can use them to frustrate the President. I do not argue that this ought
never to be done, but it ought to be done intelligently and in the national
interest, not irresponsibly and for the particular interest.
This is probably the most difficult and persistent of all our public problems. To call for institutional reform capable of transforming Congress
from a representative of the particular into a representative of the general
interest is to ask the people, on occasion, to sacrifice their own interest to
that of their fellows. And although it is not difficult to obtain a hypothetical
consent to such a proposition, the willingness to make the actual sacrifice is
a different matter. I can imagine the vast lack of enthusiasm, in Congress
and the country, with which a proposal to alter the residency qualification
for Congressional membership would be greeted. It is embarrassing even to
mention it as part of a theoretical analysis of governmental reform. The
British have evolved a method of producing a national consensus in their
Parliament through the centralized control of nominations. This makes the
legislator more responsible to the central party organization and thus to the
nation as a whole than to the members of the constituency from which he
is elected. It also makes possible a degree of party discipline that increases
legislative efficiency of action. It is true that there is no residency qualification in Great Britain as there is in the United States, but it appears to me
that this is less consequential than the matter of central control. This change
could be effected in the United States without a constitutional amendment,
but the prospects for such a reform seem dim. It would be difficult to explain its advantages to a public reared in a tradition so different. And we
may be certain that the local politicians who now play the dominant role in
the nominating process would oppose such a change strenuously. All of the
slogans of Jeffersonian localism, now anachronistic but effective nonetheless, would be hauled out, dusted off, and employed in the interest of a
divisive particularism. All of the enormous (and largely unfounded) prejudice of Americans against the term "centralized control" would be exploited
to the hilt.
If change occurs here it will be the result either of a long and arduous
educational program designed to convince the American people of the benefits of such a reform, or of some cataclysmic experience capable of demonstrating the inadequacies of the present system. Until then we can only hope
to have Presidents who are effective enough to create a national consensus
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and act upon it. We have thus far survived the handicaps imposed by a system of direct representation, but we should recognize that such a system has
great disadvantages. The inability of Negro citizens to enjoy their constitutional rights, the difficulty of obtaining the enactment of effective tariff laws,
the wastefulness of defense spending are all largely attributable to our failure to develop a national consensus in an institutional arrangement which
exaggerates the importance of local interests through direct representation.

CONCLUSIONS
of the cold war I have noted with interest the growing scope of criticism of the functioning of our governmental system.
This criticism has mainly followed the lines I have considered here, and it
has emanated from a great variety of sources. There has, as yet, been no
serious advocacy of sweeping and fundamental changes, but the area of concern is so vast that it seems fair to infer that something more than superficial
remedies are required.
The late President Kennedy, an intellectual of high order, well understood the realities of political life, especially as they involved the relations
of the legislative and executive branches of our government. His attempts
to weld the two into an effective consensus-producing and executing whole
were a constant frustration to the less patient, who demanded swifter solutions to national problems. Political analysts often remarked that the President, himself a long time member of the Congress, had a too great respect for
the "system" ever to question the validity of its principles. I believe, however, that President Kennedy's enthusiasm for those principles was much less
than unqualified. As an intellectual he was not only aware of the criticism,
which had reached a high point during the few months preceding his death,
but he was also capable of thinking realistically about the problem. That he
had done so even before his election to the presidency is implicit in the following words, which comprised a part of his first major address to the Congress on January 30,1960. The President said:

D

URING THE YEARS

Before my term has ended we shall have to test anew whether a nation
organized and governed such as ours can endure. The outcome is by no
means certain.

It is remarkable that these words have received so little attention, since they
quite clearly express some doubt concerning the viability of our system.
Just as clearly, the President was not suggesting revolution. Nor do I.
A truly revolutionary effort would necessarily be directed against the purposes of the nation, not merely some of its organizational aspects. An attack,
for example, upon the principles stated in the Preamble to the Constitution
would appear to me to constitute a genuinely revolutionary effort, whereas
proposals to establish a unicameral legislature or to abolish direct and geo/ graphic representation I would regard as reform measures.
I am only proposing once more the desirability of distinguishing between means and ends. We must bear in mind that to establish our nation,
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it was necessary to concede a degree of particularism which is no longer consonant with the kind of unity that is the sine qua non of survival today. In
the past we were better able to afford the luxury of disagreement and stalemate. Their consequences were inconvenience and perhaps domestic hardship. But what we did then did not have the impact upon our relations with
other nations that it does today. The lynching of a Negro fifty years ago was
no less regrettable than it would be today, but it did not then affect our attempts to entice the African nations to our side in the cold war. Unemployment has always been deprecated, but particularly so when we are trying to
demonstrate the superiority of our own economic system to that of the Communists. In the past we supported education largely because we believed its
value was intrinsic; now we are interested as well in our ability to compete
with our friends and enemies abroad.
In sum, it seems to me that the public must advance in its knowledge of
the science of government. This, I believe, would be highly desirable even
aside from the international aspects of the problem. Government would be
less expensive and more efficient if we were capable of viewing its structure
in the same critical and analytical manner that we do those of, say, business
organizations. Of course we have not done this. The aura of tradition which
surrounds government is too great. It is unfortunate that it seems more attached to the structure than to the principles of government. We have sanctified the means and often lost sight of the ends.
I do not wish to overstate the case, although I understand that many
would argue that I have already done so. I realize that changes have been
made, and that the means employed have altered considerably. We have
shared, to a considerable extent, the genius of our British cousins for varying
the substance without changing the form. With few changes in our Constitution in 175 years we have made it more democratic, more representative,
more responsible. It has been adapted from a predominantly agrarian to a
predominantly industrial society. I admire the great process of transmutation which has occurred. This, however, does not provide irrefutable evidence of future success. The burden of domestic depression, hot war, and
cold war has been enormous. And, as I have suggested, the situation during
the last decade or so has been especially difficult because the threat from
without creates a social aversion to internal change. We tend to cling to the
old - or what we are told the old was. We are less inclined to accept the
changes necessary to achieve a national consensus, and most do not understand either our failure to do so or its causes.
President Kennedy stated that "The outcome is by no means certain."
Surely this is the most optimistic view that can sensibly be taken. The maintenance of our system as we know it depends, I believe, upon the ability of
the people to understand what is involved, for they must give their consent.
Powerful forces stand in opposition to change. Who is going to tell the peopie? Who dares tell them, knowing that to do so is to lay oneself open to the
charge of revolution, radicalism, disloyalty, or, at best, weak-headedness. Of
course there is nothing new in that. It is, in large part, the story of history.
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